

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
(English translation from the original Japanese-language document)

May 7, 2013

To Whom It May Concern:

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Nichirei Announces Continuation of the “Fair Rules Concerning A Substantial Acquisition of the Company’s Shares, etc. (Takeover Defensive Measures)”

Nichirei Corporation (“Nichirei” or the “Company”) introduced “Fair Rules Concerning A Substantial Acquisition of the Company’s Shares, etc.” (the “Fair Rules”) upon obtaining the approval of its shareholders at the 89th ordinary general meeting of shareholders of the Company held on June 26, 2007, and continued the Fair Rules upon obtaining the approval of its shareholders at the 92nd ordinary general meeting of shareholders of the Company held on June 25, 2010. The Company hereby announces that, at the meeting of its board of directors held on May 7, 2013, the Company decided to continue the Fair Rules, as described below, for the purpose of consistently ensuring and improving the Company’s corporate value and the common interests of its shareholders whereas the effective term of the current Fair Rules would expire at the time of the close of the 95th ordinary general meeting of shareholders of the Company which is scheduled to be held on June 25, 2013. The Company decided that the continuation of the Fair Rules would take effect on the condition that the proposal concerning gratis allotment (*musho-wariate*) of stock acquisition rights (*shin-kabu yoyaku ken*) relating to the Fair Rules (as described in 4.(3) below) would be adopted by its shareholders at the 95th ordinary general meeting of shareholders of the Company, in order to take into consideration the intention of the shareholders.

The status of the major shareholders of the Company as of March 31, 2013 is as shown in Exhibit 1. At present, the Company has no knowledge as to any specific signs for any substantial acquisition of the Company’s shares, etc.

1. Purpose of Adoption and Continuation of the Fair Rules

(1) The Company’s Efforts to Ensure and Improve the Corporate Value and the Common Interests of its Shareholders

Although the Company is to adopt and to continue the Fair Rules for the purpose of ensuring and improving the Company’s corporate value and the common interests of its shareholders, the Company has already started such efforts in operating its businesses, as described below, and the details of such efforts are as explained below.

The Nichirei Group has upheld its corporate management ideal, “Look hard at people’s lifestyles and provide satisfaction for people’s hearts.” As a food company “pioneer” developing superior food products and logistics networks, the Nichirei Group will seek to create and supply products and services of the highest quality and best value to achieve unparalleled customer satisfaction and grow with society as a widely trusted and well-respected firm.

Under the previous Medium-Term Business Plan, called “energy 2012”, the Company pursued the achievement of sustainable earnings growth, with the basic concept of steadily pursuing business strategies and responding promptly to changes in the operating environment.

The business environment changed drastically after the Great East Japan Earthquake and the subsequent nuclear power plant accident. However, the Company managed to bolster its earnings base in its core businesses. The Processed Foods business attained growth in the sales of processed chicken products and other frozen food products for household and commercial use. In the Logistics business, a large facility was recently constructed and put into operation. On the other hand, the Marine Products business struggled, suffering the impact of the market slowdown. It was unable to meet its goal of achieving stable earnings.

The Nichirei Group has started its new Medium-Term Business Plan, “RISING 2015,” which is to last for three (3) years from this fiscal year. The Company plans to use its management resources to secure sustainable growth in response to significant environmental changes, including the rapid aging of the population and continuing globalization. To meet customer needs promptly, the Processed Foods business will change to a structure composed of organizations catering to customers’ business categories. It will supply differentiated products, increase the production capacity of mainstay products for household use and other products at directly operated factories, and introduce the best allocation of the product line in an effort to increase sales and profit margins. The Logistics business has the largest network in the country. To expand sales, it will be further improved to speed up its ability to capture demand for storage, transport, and delivery.

In accordance with this medium-term business plan, the Company plans to make more positive investments, chiefly in the Processed Foods business and the Logistics business, than under the previous plan so it can be fully prepared to meet future changes in business conditions. To achieve substantial sales growth, the Company plans to steadily expand its business into growing overseas markets. Regarding the financial aspects, the Company will allocate the Group’s management resources appropriately and continue to implement a policy of providing appropriate returns to shareholders, including the acquisition of treasury stock and a dividend increase., The company will maintain the existing dividend policy, targeting a consolidated dividend on equity (DOE) of 2.5%.

(2) Purpose of Adoption and Continuation of the Fair Rules

The Company believes that, if a Proposing Party (defined in 4.(1)① below) targeting the Company’s shares, etc. appears, the Company should refer to its shareholders the final decision as to whether the Company’s stock should be sold as proposed. In order to ensure the proper decision by shareholders, however, it will be important to provide such shareholders with sufficient information on the relevant takeover proposal submitted by the Proposing Party, as well as the opportunity to review the possibility of adopting alternative proposals and so forth. With increased consciousness among consumers as to “safety and stable supply” of food and the “Health Value,” in order to ensure and improve the Company’s corporate value and the common interests of its shareholders, it will be necessary for the Company, as mentioned above, (i) to create and supply products and services of the highest quality and best value to achieve unparalleled customer satisfaction as a food company “pioneer”, (ii) to grow with society as a widely trusted and well-respected firm, and (iii) to demonstrate management practices as a responsible corporation in every respect, including the practices related to CSR, as mentioned above. If a Proposing Party lacking in understanding of such matters acquires the Company’s shares, etc., damages the Nichirei Group’s competitiveness by placing importance on short-term economic efficiency only, and takes actions which are against medium or long-term management policies, etc., the Company’s corporate value and the common interests of its shareholders may be impaired. Among takeover proposals, there may be some which would impair the Company’s corporate value and the common interests of its shareholders, depending on the forms they take, as mentioned above. Therefore, the Company believes it necessary for shareholders to make the relevant decision after having been provided with sufficient information.

The Nichirei Group consists of Nichirei Corporation, 76 subsidiaries and 14 affiliates, as of March 31,


2013, and engages in processed foods, marine products, meat and poultry products, logistics, real estate, and other operations. The Company has also physically developed its business activities in 12 countries through its subsidiaries and bases of operations. For the management of the Nichirei Group, it is definitely necessary to have wide knowledge of such operations and rich experience therein, as well as a full understanding as to the relationship established with customers, employees and business partners worldwide. When a takeover proposal is submitted and shareholders are required to make a decision as to whether or not the relevant takeover proposal should be accepted, it will also be necessary to fully understand the said matters in order to ensure the proper evaluation of the value of the Company stock. The Company has already made efforts to provide its shareholders with information through its active IR activities. When a takeover proposal is submitted, however, in order to have its shareholders properly determine whether or not to accept the proposal made by the Proposing Party, it will be definitely necessary to provide shareholders with appropriate and sufficient information both from the Company and the Proposing Party (e.g., the details of the management policies and business plans of the Nichirei Group intended by the Proposing Party, the effect from the takeover proposal on the Company's shareholders and the business management of the Nichirei Group, or an effect on a number of stakeholders surrounding the Nichirei Group, the idea on social responsibility including that "safety and stable supply" of food, etc., will be provided by the Proposing Party) and also provide the shareholders with a review period necessary to make the relevant decision. In some cases, the Company may also make a possible alternative proposal to its shareholders, so that the shareholders can choose a more favorable proposal in view of the benefits to the Company's corporate value and the common interests of its shareholders.

Taking the said matters into consideration, the board of directors of the Company came to the conclusion that, when a substantial acquisition was to be made, the Company should obtain necessary and sufficient information from the relevant Proposing Party, in advance, and, this time, the board of directors of the Company decided that the Fair Rules should be continued on the condition that the proposal concerning a gratis allotment of stock acquisition rights (as described in 4.(3) below) relating to the Fair Rules would be adopted at the 95th ordinary general meeting of shareholders, whereby the continuation of the Fair Rules would be approved by its shareholders. The Fair Rules will be explained in due order in the following sections.

2. Summary of the Fair Rules

The details of the Fair Rules will be described in Section 4. "Details of the Fair Rules" below, and the outline of such rules is as shown in the chart on the next page. (The terms used in the chart will be defined, as appropriate, in this press release.)

Enforcement or Non-Enforcement of Defensive Measures Pursuant to the Fair Rules



※ Above flow chart was prepared only to explain the outline of the Fair Rules so please refer to the main text of this press release for details of the Fair Rules.

3. Features of the Fair Rules

(1) The Company ascertained the intention of its shareholders when it adopted and subsequently continued the Fair Rules. In regards to the continuation of the Fair Rules this time, in order to ascertain the intention of the shareholders, the Company will, in accordance with Article 13 of the articles of incorporation, ask its shareholders for approval of any future entrustment of the relevant resolution to the board of directors in the cases where the relevant requirements under the Fair Rules are satisfied and therefore the board of directors can resolve a gratis allotment of stock acquisition rights without a resolution of a general meeting of shareholders. In other words, the “adoption and continuation of the Fair Rules” itself will reflect the intention of the shareholders.

(2) Under the Fair Rules, the board of directors may take defensive measures against a takeover proposal without ascertaining the relevant intention of the shareholders only when there is a violation of procedures of the Fair Rules (limited to a violation of procedures where it is appropriate to take defensive measures based on such violation; the same shall apply hereinafter), and in any such limited cases, the relevant intention of the shareholders regarding the adoption and continuation thereof will be also ascertained, as stated in (1) above.

(3) If a defensive measures is taken in the cases other than those stated in (2) above, the Company will ascertain the intention of the shareholders through a resolution of a general meeting of shareholders.

(4) As to the verification regarding (i) whether or not a Proposing Party is in violation of procedures of the Fair Rules and (ii) whether or not the relevant takeover proposal will impair the Company’s corporate value and the common interests of its shareholders in light of “1. (2) Purpose of Adoption and Continuation of the Fair Rules” etc., in addition to the verification by the board of directors, an independent committee will also independently make the relevant verification.

4. Details of the Fair Rules

(1) Procedures of the Fair Rules

① Persons to whom the Fair Rules Apply

The persons to whom the Fair Rules apply will refer to those persons (i) who intend to acquire the share certificates, etc., (as defined in Article 27-23, Paragraph 1¹ of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Law (the “FIEL”)) which constitute twenty percent (20%) or more of the holding ratio of share certificates, etc. (as defined in Article 27-23, Paragraph 4 of the FIEL) of the Company (for the purpose of calculation of such holding ratio of share certificates, etc., the number of share certificates, etc. held by the relevant person’s joint holders (as defined in Article 27-23, Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the FIEL) will also be taken into account; the same shall apply hereinafter), or (ii) who intend to purchase by means of a tender offer the share certificates, etc., (as defined in Article 27-2, Paragraph 1 of the FIEL) which constitute twenty percent (20%) or more of the ratio of ownership of share certificates, etc. (as defined in Article 27-2, Paragraph 8 of the FIEL, and inclusive of the ratio of ownership of share certificates, etc. of the person having a special relationship defined in Article 27-2, Paragraph 7 of the FIEL; the same shall apply hereinafter) of the Company. If the Company has in advance agreed upon a specific person through a resolution of its board of directors, however, such person shall be excluded from the persons to whom the Fair Rules apply. The persons referred to in (i) and (ii) above (other than those

¹ If there is an amendment, etc. to the provisions of laws, regulations, etc. cited in this press release, the relevant reference shall be made to the corresponding provisions of laws, regulations, etc., so amended, etc.

excluded from the persons to whom the Fair Rules apply by a resolution of the board of directors in advance) shall be referred to as the “Proposing Party”, and the share certificates, etc. as provided for in (i) and (ii) above shall collectively be referred to as the “Controlling Shares, etc.”

The Proposing Party shall not consummate the acquisition of the Controlling Shares, etc. of the Company or make a public notice of commencement of the purchase of the Controlling Shares, etc. by means of a tender offer, until the board of directors adopts a Resolution to Accept a Takeover Proposal (as defined in 4.(1)④ below), or until a general meeting of shareholders affirms a Rejection of Taking Defensive Measures (as defined in 4.(1)⑤ below), pursuant to the Fair Rules. If there is a violation of this, the board of directors will enforce the relevant defensive measures on the grounds that there is a violation of procedures of the Fair Rules. Please note that, accordingly, a Proposing Party will be required to wait for a certain period of time before such party materializes its takeover proposal in accordance with the Fair Rules.

② Submission of Intention Letter and Required Information by the Proposing Party

Under the Fair Rules, the Company will request, before a takeover proposal materializes, that the Proposing Party submit to the Company an intention letter prepared in the format designated by the Company to comply with the Fair Rules. In the intention letter, the name, address, the name of the representative, governing law of incorporation, contact details in Japan of the Proposing Party and an outline, etc. of the takeover proposal should be specified.

The Company shall, within ten (10) business days after receipt of the intention letter, deliver to the Proposing Party the initial list of the information necessary for decisions to be made by the Company’s shareholders and its independent committee (as explained in detail in 4.(1)③ below) and for opinions to be formed by its board of directors (such information will be referred to as the “Required Information”). The Proposing Party shall submit to the Company a takeover proposal statement containing all the Required Information so required. The Required Information to be contained in a takeover proposal statement will, although it depends on the nature of the relevant takeover proposal, possibly include the following information:

<Required Information>

- (i) Information on the Proposing Party and its group (including joint holders, and members or other constituents (in the case of an investment fund));
- (ii) Information on acquisition of the Controlling Shares, etc.:
i.e., the purpose, method and details of the acquisition (including the amount/type of consideration for acquisition of the Controlling Shares, etc., the time of acquisition, the structure of the relevant transaction, the legality of the method of acquisition, and the feasibility of acquisition);
- (iii) Grounds for calculation of consideration for acquisition of the Controlling Shares, etc. (including the facts/assumptions for calculation, the method of calculation, the numerical information used for calculation, any synergies expected to be created through a series of transactions related to acquisition and allocation of the synergy and the grounds for the relevant calculation of such allocation);
- (iv) Evidence of funds for acquisition of the Controlling Shares, etc. (including the specific name of the provider of funds (including the substantial providers), the methods of procurement, and the details of the relevant transactions);
- (v) The management policies, etc. of the Company after the acquisition of the Controlling Shares, etc.:
i.e., the management policies, business plans, capital policies and dividend plans of the Company and the Nichirei Group after the acquisition of the Controlling Shares, etc. (including selling of shares, selling of businesses or assets, mergers, corporate splits, stock-for-stock exchanges (*kabushiki-kokan*, *kabushiki-iten*), civil rehabilitation, corporate rehabilitation, bankruptcy, liquidation, changes in the current

- equity, dividend payout ratio, dividend policies, debts or total equity, changes in the corporate structure, businesses, management policies or business plans of the Company, acquisition or disposal of stock and other securities of the Company, delistings, and any unconventional transactions);
- (vi) Policies for treatment of the Company's and Nichirei Group's employees, business partners, customers, regional societies or other interest parties (stakeholders) related to the Company (including the understanding toward CSR) after the acquisition of the Controlling Shares, etc.;
 - (vii) Procedures required to be followed by the Proposing Party for acquisition of the Controlling Shares, etc.:
i.e., any related and necessary approvals, etc. of government authorities, the consents, etc. of third parties, and the applicability of the anti-monopoly law or other competition law or other important laws of the countries or regions where the Company conducts its business activities or sells products;
 - (viii) Specific measures to circumvent conflicts of interest, if there are any such conflicts with other shareholders of the Company; and
 - (ix) Other information which is determined to be reasonably necessary by the independent committee.

The Company will disclose, as necessary, in part or in their entirety, the fact that an intention letter and/or a takeover proposal statement are submitted by the Proposing Party, the details of the intention letter and the takeover proposal statement, and any other information provided by the Proposing Party, in the timeframe and manner that the Company finds appropriate.

③ Referring a Proposal to the Independent Committee and Recommendations for Taking Defensive Measures

The board of directors shall refer a takeover proposal statement received from a Proposing Party to the independent committee, which consists of three (3) or more members to be appointed by the board of directors from among outside executives of the Company, scholars, well-informed people, etc. The term of office of such independent committee members will be one (1) year, and, after the close of the 95th ordinary general meeting of shareholders, Mr. Seigo Hanji, Mr. Kazuhiro Mishina and Ms. Mami Taniguchi, outside directors of the Company, and Mr. Kunitaro Saida and Mr. Masaaki Okajima, outside auditor of the Company, are planned to be reappointed as the independent committee members. (Please refer to Exhibit 2 hereto for the brief personal histories, etc. of such five (5) independent committee members.)

With respect to any takeover proposal statements, the independent committee will examine (i) whether or not the Required Information has been satisfactorily provided or otherwise whether the Fair Rules have been complied with, and (ii) whether or not the takeover proposal will improve the Company's corporate value and the common interests of its shareholders in light of "1. (2) Purpose of Adoption and Continuation of the Fair Rules" etc. If the independent committee determines that the Required Information provided in the takeover proposal statement is not sufficient enough for decisions to be made by the Company's shareholders and its independent committee and for opinions to be formed by its board of directors, the independent committee will i) designate as appropriate a reasonable date for the Proposing Party to reply and ii) demand through the board of directors that the Proposing Party provide additional Required Information by such date. The independent committee will objectively examine, in light of the Fair Rules, whether or not the Required Information has been satisfactorily provided in the takeover proposal statement. When the independent committee determines that the Required Information has been satisfactorily provided, the independent committee will make a notice to the board of directors to that effect. The Company will disclose, as necessary, the fact that the Company receives this notice from the independent committee, in the timeframe and manner that the Company finds appropriate. If the independent committee decides that (i) there is a violation

of procedures of the Fair Rules on the part of the Proposing Party, including the case where additional Required Information has not been provided by the Proposing Party by the designated date, or (ii) the takeover proposal will impair the Company's corporate value and the common interests of its shareholders, the independent committee will, with informing the board of directors of the relevant decision, recommend that the board of directors should take defensive measures under the Fair Rules (i.e., "Recommendation for Taking Defensive Measures"). In the cases other than (i) or (ii) above, the independent committee may, as necessary, make any recommendation, including a recommendation for not taking defensive measures, to the board of directors. (Please refer to Exhibit 3 hereto for a summary of the Independent Committee Rules.)

④ The Board of Directors' Resolution to Take Defensive Measures

When the board of directors receives a Recommendation for Taking Defensive Measures under the Fair Rules from the independent committee based on its decision that a Proposing Party is in violation of procedures of the Fair Rules, the board of directors will, after confirming the Proposing Party's violation of procedures of the Fair Rules, resolve to take defensive measures and initiate the relevant defensive measures without taking a resolution of a general meeting of shareholders. (If the independent committee has not made any such Recommendation for Taking Defensive Measures against a Proposing Party for its violation of procedures of the Fair Rules, the board of directors will not take any defensive measures, at its sole discretion, solely on the grounds that there is a violation of procedures of the Fair Rules.)

Except when the board of directors is allowed to take defensive measures without taking a resolution of a general meeting of shareholders in accordance with the provisions stated above, the board of directors will examine and review whether or not the relevant takeover proposal should be accepted, by taking into consideration whether or not the relevant proposal will contribute to the Company's corporate value and the common interests of its shareholders in light of "1. (2) Purpose of Adoption and Continuation of the Fair Rules" etc. Such examination and review of a proposal will continue for sixty (60) business days from the day when the independent committee makes a notice to the board of directors that the relevant Required Information is completely provided in the case of a takeover proposal in which the relevant consideration is paid in cash in Japanese Yen only and the ceiling number of shares to be purchased has not been set, and for ninety (90) business days from the day when the above mentioned notice is made that the relevant Required Information is completely provided in the case of any other takeover proposals (provided, however, that either of such periods may be extended, unless the independent committee raises objections thereto, when a general meeting of shareholders is to be held for ascertaining the intention of the shareholders, or otherwise when there is a reasonable ground for extending such period. When either of such periods is extended, the Company will disclose the specific extended period and the reason for such extension.) (such periods will be referred to as the "Review Period"). Thereafter, if the board of directors determines that the takeover proposal may impair the Company's corporate value and the common interests of its shareholders, the board of directors will resolve to take defensive measures against the takeover proposal under the Fair Rules (a "Resolution to Take Defensive Measures") and convene a general meeting of shareholders, which shall be held by the end of the Review Period, in order to ascertain the intention of the shareholders as to whether or not the relevant defensive measures should be taken.

Cases where the board of directors may determine that the Company's corporate value and the common interests of its shareholders may be impaired, include, as an example and without limitation, the following:

- (i) Where the Company's corporate value and the common interests of its shareholders may be impaired by the following actions, etc.:

- (a) acquiring the share certificates, etc. and demanding that the Company or its related persons, etc. buy back the share certificates, etc. at a high price;
 - (b) carrying out management to realize the interests of a purchaser, etc. at the cost of the Company such as the acquisition of significant assets, etc. of the Nichirei Group at a low price by controlling the management of the Company temporarily;
 - (c) appropriating the Nichirei Group's assets as mortgage or resource of payment of the purchaser, etc. and its group companies, etc.;
 - (d) causing the Company to dispose of valuable assets, etc. that are not related to the business of the Nichirei Group in the immediate future and in order to pay out high dividends temporarily with the profits from the disposal, and/or to sell shares at a high price by seizing the opportunity in respect of a rapid increase in share prices resulting from such temporary pay-out of high dividends, by controlling the management of the Company temporarily.
- (ii) Where an acquisition, such as a coercive two-tier purchase (which refers to the purchase of share certificates, etc. in a tender offer where the purchase of all of the share certificates, etc. is not solicited in the first stage of the purchase, and the terms and conditions in the second stage of the purchase are set unfavorably or not stated clearly) may actually force the shareholders to sell their shares.
- (iii) Where the terms and conditions of the acquisition (including the amount/type of consideration for the acquisition, the timing of the acquisition, the legality of the method of acquisition, the feasibility of the acquisition, the management policies and business plans after the acquisition, and policies for treatment, etc. of the Company's other shareholders, employees, customers, business partners and other interest parties related to the Company after the acquisition) are insufficient or inappropriate in view of the Company's primary value.
- (iv) Where the acquisition may undermine the Nichirei Group's relationship with employees, customers, business partners, etc., or the Nichirei Group's brand value, corporate ideals and vision, etc. which are essential to generating the Company's corporate value, and may impair the Company's corporate value and the common interests of its shareholders.

Additionally, under the Fair Rules, including the aforementioned cases, the approval of a general meeting of shareholders, in addition to the resolution of the board of directors to take defensive measures, is inevitably required for the taking of defensive measures to be taken on the grounds that a proposed takeover may impair the Company's corporate value and the common interests of its shareholders. Therefore, such arrangement is retained that prevents the board of directors from taking defensive measures for its selfish intention.

On the other hand, if the board of directors determines that the takeover proposal will contribute to the Company's corporate value and the common interests of its shareholders through its examination during the Review Period, the board of directors will resolve not to take defensive measures against the takeover proposal under the Fair Rules (a "Resolution Not to Take Defensive Measures"). In such a case, the board of directors may, unless it has received from the independent committee a Recommendation for Taking Defensive Measures as to the relevant takeover proposal under the Fair Rules, allow the Proposing Party to materialize the takeover proposal, without ascertaining the intention of the shareholders, and even when the takeover proposal is materialized by the Proposing Party, no defensive measures will be taken under the Fair Rules. Even when a Resolution Not to Take Defensive Measures is adopted, the board of directors has to convene a general meeting of shareholders and ascertain the intention of the

shareholders as to whether or not defensive measures should be taken against the relevant takeover proposal, if the independent committee has made a Recommendation for Taking Defensive Measures.

Under the Fair Rules, the board of directors' resolution not to take defensive measures when the board of directors has not received any Recommendation for Taking Defensive Measures under the Fair Rules from the independent committee as to a takeover proposal shall be referred to as a "Resolution to Accept a Takeover Proposal."

⑤ Ascertaining of the Intention of Shareholders

When (i) the independent committee has made a Recommendation for Taking Defensive Measures against a takeover proposal (excluding the case where such recommendation is made on the grounds that the Proposing Party is in violation of procedures of the Fair Rules and when the board of directors may take defensive measures only with a resolution of the board of directors, by confirming such violation), or (ii) when the independent committee has not made a Recommendation for Taking Defensive Measures and the board of directors determines that the Company's corporate value or the common interests of its shareholders may be impaired and adopts a Resolution to Take Defensive Measures, the board of directors shall ascertain the intention of the shareholders as to whether or not defense measures should be taken. Such ascertaining of the intention of the shareholders shall be made through a resolution for approval of taking defensive measures at a general meeting of shareholders and, specifically speaking, a proposal for entrusting the decision on gratis allotment of stock acquisition rights to the board of directors will be referred to a general meeting of shareholders, and such resolution will be proposed. In such a case, if the relevant proposal is rejected at a general meeting of shareholders, no defensive measures will be taken under the Fair Rules against the relevant takeover proposal. Under the Fair Rules, such rejection of a proposal for taking defensive measures at a general meeting of shareholders shall be referred to as "Rejection of Taking Defensive Measures."

When the board of directors is to ascertain the intention of shareholders, the board of directors shall decide on the convocation of a general meeting of shareholders to be held on or before the last day of the Review Period. Such general meeting of shareholders to ascertain the intention of shareholders shall be held in accordance with the following procedures:

- (a) Requirement for Resolution:
At a general meeting of shareholders, resolution for enforcement of defensive measures under the Fair Rules shall be adopted by a majority of the voting rights of the shareholders who are present thereat and are eligible for exercising voting rights, including the exercise in writing or through an electromagnetic method.
- (b) Shareholders Eligible for Exercising Voting Rights:
The shareholders who are eligible for exercising voting rights at a general meeting of shareholders shall be those shareholders who are listed or recorded in the latest shareholders' register as of the record date set by the board of directors.
- (c) Disclosure of Results:
The Company will, after it determines the relevant results, promptly disclose the results of any resolution adopted at a general meeting of shareholders for ascertaining the intention of the shareholders as to whether defensive measures should be taken against a takeover proposal.

Except as otherwise provided by law, only the board of directors is entitled to convene a general meeting of shareholders to ascertain the intention of shareholders regarding whether or not

defensive measures should be taken under the Fair Rules against a takeover proposal. In addition, the board of directors may decide not to hold a general meeting of shareholders, even after the board of directors decided to hold a general meeting of shareholders in accordance with the above, if either of the following events occurs before the date of such general meeting of shareholders, and in the case of (x) below, the board of directors may take defensive measures immediately under the Fair Rules:

- (x) When the requirement for taking defensive measures only with a resolution of the board of directors has been satisfied as a result of the Proposing Party violating procedures of the Fair Rules;
- (y) When the independent committee has made no Recommendation for Taking Defensive Measures against a takeover proposal (if there is a newly found fact, limited to the case where the independent committee having reviewed the relevant fact does not make any Recommendation for Taking Defensive Measures) and the board of directors has newly adopted a Resolution Not to Take Defensive Measures under the Fair Rules.

If the board of directors decides not to hold the above said general meeting of shareholders, this would mean that the intention of shareholders has not been ascertained as to whether or not defensive measures should be taken against a takeover proposal. Therefore, in order for the board of directors to enforce defensive measures against a takeover proposal again, in the case of (y) above, it will be necessary to obtain the approval of a general meeting of shareholders with respect to the enforcement of the relevant defensive measures by again convening a general meeting of shareholders.

⑥ The Board of Directors' Resolution to Make or Not to Make Gratis Allotment of Stock Acquisition Rights based on a Resolution of a General Meeting of Shareholders

Unless a takeover proposal is withdrawn by the relevant Proposing Party, the board of directors shall resolve, based on the results of the said procedures for ascertaining the intention of shareholders, to make or not to make gratis allotment of stock acquisition rights and disclose the details of such resolution. In other words, when the enforcement of defensive measures against a takeover proposal is approved at the said general meeting of shareholders (the "Approval of Taking Defensive Measures") and the Proposing Party becomes a Purchaser (as defined in 4.(1)⑦ below) by performing its takeover proposal, the board of directors shall resolve to make gratis allotment of stock acquisition rights pursuant to the Fair Rules. Conversely, if the said general meeting of shareholders makes a Rejection of Taking Defensive Measures, the board of directors shall resolve not to make gratis allotment of stock acquisition rights even when the Proposing Party becomes a Purchaser by performing its takeover proposal.

⑦ Resolution to Make Gratis Allotment of Stock Acquisition Rights

When the board of directors adopts a Resolution to Accept a Takeover Proposal, or when a general meeting of shareholders makes a Rejection of Taking Defensive Measures, no defensive measure shall be taken against the relevant takeover proposal. However, in other circumstances, if a Proposing Party (i) makes a public notice of commencement of a tender offer so that the ratio of ownership of share certificates, etc. will be twenty percent (20%) or more after the relevant purchase, or (ii) acquires or holds the Controlling Shares, etc. of the Company, the board of directors will, in order to lower the holding ratio of share certificates, etc. or the ratio of ownership of share certificates, etc. of the relevant person (a "Purchaser"), resolve to make gratis allotment of stock acquisition rights with restrictions on the exercise of rights by the Purchaser and its related parties, etc. (to be explained in detail in 4.(2)④ below; hereinafter referred to as the "Purchaser, etc.") or with distinctions of the Purchaser, etc. from other parties in relation to the acquisition of the stock acquisition rights with conditions for acquisition or in relation to the

consideration for acquisition, as defensive measures under the Fair Rules. However, such resolution to make gratis allotment of stock acquisition rights under the Fair Rules can be adopted only (i) when the requirement for taking defensive measures only with a resolution of the board of directors has been satisfied as a result of the Proposing Party violating procedures of the Fair Rules, or (ii) when a general meeting of shareholders makes Approval of Taking Defensive Measures.

Even after the board of directors resolves to make gratis allotment of stock acquisition rights, if the relevant Proposing Party withdraws its takeover proposal or otherwise when the relevant purchase ceases to exist, the board of directors may resolve to (i) cancel the gratis allotment of stock acquisition rights if it is before the relevant gratis allotment becomes effective, or (ii) acquire the relevant stock acquisition rights, free of charge, if it is after the relevant gratis allotment becomes effective, as the case may be. When the board of directors resolves to cancel gratis allotment of stock acquisition rights, or to acquire the relevant stock acquisition rights, free of charge, in accordance with the above, the relevant shareholders will ultimately not acquire or hold the stock acquisition rights of the Company. In such a case, the stock price of the Company may be affected.

⑧ Disclosure of the Details of Resolution to Make a Gratis Allotment of Stock Acquisition Rights

When the board of directors resolves to make a gratis allotment of stock acquisition rights as stated in ⑦ above, the board of directors shall promptly disclose information on the details of such resolution and other related matters.

⑨ Disclosure of Information

In administering the Fair Rules, the Company, in addition to those separately set forth in the Fair Rules, shall disclose, in a timely manner, information that pertains to the progress of the procedures of the Fair Rules, a summary of the Independent Committee's recommendations, etc., a summary of resolutions of the board of directors of the Company, a summary of a resolution of a general meeting of shareholders in order to ascertain the intention of shareholders or any other matters that the board of directors of the Company deems appropriate, pursuant to applicable laws and regulations or the rules and regulations of financial instruments exchanges, etc.

(2) Outline of a Gratis Allotment of Stock Acquisition Rights

When the board of directors resolves to make a gratis allotment of stock acquisition rights, the board of directors will allot the stock acquisition rights free of charge, (i) with restrictions on the exercise of rights by the Purchaser, etc. or (ii) with distinctions of the Purchaser, etc. from others in relation to the acquisition of the stock acquisition rights with conditions for acquisition or in relation to the consideration for acquisition, to the relevant shareholders. As to any such gratis allotment of stock acquisition rights, the Company believes that disclosing the details, etc. thereof, in advance, will contribute to the benefits of its shareholders and investors in view of the relevant predictability, etc. Therefore, the Company will disclose the information on such gratis allotment of stock acquisition rights, as much as possible as follows:

① Types of Shares to be Issued upon Exercise of Stock Acquisition Rights:

The common shares of the Company.

② Total Number of Shares to be Issued upon Exercise of Stock Acquisition Rights:

The maximum number of such shares shall be the number obtained after deducting the total number of outstanding shares of the Company from the total number of shares of the Company authorized to be issued.

③ Value of Assets to be Paid upon the Exercise of Stock Acquisition Rights:

Assets to be paid upon the exercise of stock acquisition rights shall be money, and the amount to be paid upon the exercise of stock acquisition rights shall be the amount equivalent to one (1) yen or more per share of the Company determined by the board of directors.

④ Conditions for Exercising Stock Acquisition Rights:

The following conditions or other conditions may be imposed for the exercise of stock acquisition rights. Any person who fails to satisfy the requirements of (i) or (ii) below shall be referred to as the “Purchaser, etc.” in this press release:

- (i) The person exercising the stock acquisition rights does not fall under any of the following:
 - (a) the Purchaser;
 - (b) a person having a special relationship with (Article 27-2, Paragraph 7 of the FIEL) or is a joint holder of (Article 27-23, Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the FIEL) the Purchaser;
 - (c) a person who purchased or succeeded to the relevant stock acquisition rights from the person applicable to (a) or (b) above without obtaining a consent of the board of directors of the Company; or
 - (d) a related person of the person applicable to any of (a) through (c) above (a “related person” shall mean a person determined by the board of directors of the Company as a person substantially controlling the relevant person, controlled by the relevant person or under common control with the relevant person, or a person determined by the board of directors of the Company as a person acting cooperatively with the relevant person. “Control” shall mean “controlling the decisions on financial and business policies” of another company, etc. (see Article 3 of the Enforcement Regulations of the Company Law));
- (ii) Either (a) the person is exercising the relevant rights for his/her own benefit, or (b) if the person is exercising the relevant rights on behalf of a third party, such third party satisfies the requirement of (i) above; and
- (iii) When requested by the board of directors of the Company, a written representation and warranty in relation to the satisfaction of the requirements of (i) and (ii) above shall be submitted.

⑤ Restriction on Transfer

Any transfer of stock acquisition rights shall require an approval of the board of directors of the Company.

⑥ Acquisition of Stock Acquisition Rights by the Company

- (i) At any time before the day of commencement of the exercise period for the relevant stock acquisition rights, the Company may acquire all the stock acquisition rights, free of charge, as of the arrival of the date designated by the board of directors, if the board of directors deems it appropriate for the Company to acquire such stock acquisition rights.

- (ii) The Company will acquire the relevant stock acquisition rights by acquiring all stock acquisition rights held by persons other than those persons who are not eligible to exercise such stock acquisition rights pursuant to the provisions of ④ above, and in exchange therefor, the Company will deliver its common shares, as of the arrival of the date designated by the board of directors.

The maximum number of the common shares of the Company to be delivered as consideration for acquiring stock acquisition rights by the method described above shall be the number obtained by deducting the total number of outstanding shares of the Company from the total number of shares of the Company authorized to be issued.

(3) Procedures for Adopting and Continuing the Fair Rules

As to the enforcement of defensive measures when a takeover proposal is made, including the cases where such defensive measures are to be taken on the grounds that the Company's corporate value and the common interests of its shareholders may be impaired, the Fair Rules require a resolution of a general meeting of shareholders, in principle, so the Fair Rules reflect the intention of the shareholders in this respect (please see 4.(1)④ for a case where a defensive measure can be taken without ascertaining the intention of the shareholders).

However, the Company thinks it necessary that the intention of the shareholders be reflected in regards to "adopting and continuing the Fair Rules" itself, and not only in regards to whether or not the relevant defensive measures should be taken. Therefore, the Company, when it adopted and subsequently continued the Fair Rules, asked its shareholders for approval of the introduction thereof. In regards to the continuation of the Fair Rules this time, the Company will, in accordance with Article 13 of the articles of incorporation, ask its shareholders for approval of any future entrustment of the relevant resolution to the board of directors through a resolution of a general meeting of shareholders in the cases where the relevant requirements are satisfied and therefore the Company can decide upon gratis allotment of stock acquisition rights without taking a resolution of a general meeting of shareholders and with a resolution of the board of directors only pursuant to the procedures set forth in the Fair Rules, and thereby ascertain the intention of the shareholders as to whether or not the Fair Rules should be continued.

(4) Effective Term, Abolition, Revision, etc. of the Fair Rules

The effective term of the continued Fair Rules shall be from the time when the proposal for gratis allotment of stock acquisition rights as described in 4.(3) in relation to the Fair Rules is adopted at the 95th ordinary general meeting of shareholders until the close of the ordinary general meeting of shareholders to be held in 2016; provided, however, that even before the expiration of such effective term, the Fair Rules shall be abolished, at the time of the resolution if the board of directors resolves to abolish the Fair Rules. When the board of directors resolves to revise or change the Fair Rules before the expiration of the effective term (any such substantial revision of or change to the Fair Rules shall require the approval of a general meeting of shareholders (with a majority of the voting rights held by the shareholders who are present thereat and are eligible for exercising their voting rights)), the board of directors shall promptly disclose the details of such revision or change or other necessary information. In order to further renew and continue the Fair Rules upon the expiration of the effective term stated above, the board of directors shall obtain the approval of a general meeting of shareholders (with a majority of the voting rights held by the shareholders who are present thereat and are eligible for exercising their voting rights).

5. Reasonableness of the Fair Rules

- (1) Consistent with the Guidelines Concerning Takeover Defensive Measures and the Corporate

Value Study Group's Reports

The Fair Rules satisfy the three (3) principles provided in the "Guidelines of takeover defensive measure for ensuring and/or improving corporate value and common interests of shareholders" released on May 27, 2005, by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Justice and also conform with suggestions in "Takeover Defense Measures in Light of Recent Environmental Changes" announced by the Corporate Value Study Group on June 30, 2008.

(2) A Type which Shareholders Directly Decide

With respect to the Fair Rules, the Company ascertained the intention of its shareholders when the Fair Rules were adopted. As described in 4.(3) above and in accordance with Article 13 of the articles of incorporation, the Company, when continuing the Fair Rules this time, will ask its shareholders to approve any future entrustment of relevant resolutions to the board of directors through a resolution of a general meeting of shareholders in cases where relevant requirements are satisfied and thereby the Company can decide upon gratis allotments of stock acquisition rights only with a resolution of the board of directors and without a resolution of a general meeting of shareholders. Through such process of asking approval, the Company can ascertain the intention of its shareholders in respect of whether or not the Fair Rules should be continued. In addition, as described in 4.(1)⑤ above, the Fair Rules inevitably require approval of a general meeting of shareholders for taking defensive measures against a takeover proposal, unless there is a violation of procedures of the Fair Rules, and asks shareholders for their direct decision as to whether or not the takeover proposal by a Proposing Party should be accepted. As seen above, since it is necessary to obtain the approval of a general meeting of shareholders before taking defensive measures, unless there is a violation of procedures of the Fair Rules, defensive measures will not be taken for the selfish intentions of the directors. Moreover, the effective term of the continued Fair Rules is set for three (3) years, and as described in 4.(4), it is necessary to again ask shareholders for their direct decision, in order to further renew and continue the Fair Rules, upon the expiration of the effective term thereof.

(3) Decision on Taking Defensive Measures by the Independent Committee which is Independent from the Board of Directors and Restrictions on Taking Defensive Measures by Decisions of the Board of Directors

Under the Fair Rules, an independent committee consisting of members who are highly independent will be established, separate from the board of directors, in order to secure the neutrality in determining whether or not defensive measures should be taken against a takeover proposal. First of all, in order to enforce defensive measures on the grounds that there is a violation of procedures of the Fair Rules, it is inevitably required that the independent committee has recommended that the relevant measures should be taken against such violation, and this prevents the board of directors from taking defensive measures by applying the Fair Rules for its selfish intention.

In other cases, the Fair Rules require that the independent committee also review whether or not defensive measures should be taken against a takeover proposal. In other words, even when the board of directors adopts a Resolution Not to Take Defensive Measures, the board of directors has to convene a general meeting of shareholders in order to ascertain the intention of shareholders as to whether or not defensive measures should be taken, as long as a Recommendation for Taking Defensive Measures is received from the independent committee. Therefore, the Fair Rules provide the opportunity not only to prevent the board of directors from intentionally disturbing the Purchaser's takeover, but also to prevent directors from intentionally voting for the takeover, etc. to be made by directors for only their own benefit. The Fair Rules also restricts the board of directors so that the board of directors can take defensive measures against a takeover proposal without ascertaining the intention of shareholders only when there is a violation of procedures of the Fair Rules as stated in 4.(1)④ above.

(4) Takeover Defensive Measures which are not Dead Hand Type or Slow Hand Type

The term of office for the directors of the Company shall expire at the close of the ordinary general meeting of shareholders pertaining to the last business year ending within one (1) year after each director's election according to the articles of incorporation of the Company. In addition, as described in 4.(4), whether or not to abolish the Fair Rules may be determined by a resolution of the board of directors. Therefore, whether or not to continue or abolish the Fair Rules may be determined, from time to time, by a resolution of the board of directors which is composed of directors who are elected by the shareholders every year, and so it is neither a dead hand type of takeover defensive measure (takeover defensive measures which may not be prevented from being enforced even if a majority of the board members are replaced) nor a slow hand type of takeover defensive measure (takeover defensive measures which are difficult to prevent from being enforced because the board members may not be replaced at once).

6. Influence, etc. on Shareholders and Investors

(1) Influence, etc. on Shareholders and Investors upon Continuation of the Fair Rules

The Fair Rules aim to ensure and improve the common interests of shareholders of the Company by providing shareholders with information necessary to determine whether or not a takeover proposal should be accepted pursuant to the Fair Rules and by referring to the shareholders for the final decision as to whether or not the takeover proposal should be accepted, except for the cases where both the independent committee and the board of directors agree to the takeover proposal or where defensive measures may be taken only with a resolution of the board of directors due to a violation of the procedures under the Fair Rules by the Proposing Party, and thereby contribute to the benefits of the Company's shareholders and investors. At the time of the continuation of the Fair Rules, since no allotment of stock acquisition rights, etc. will be made, there will be no direct or specific influence on the shareholders and investors of the Company.

(2) Influence, etc. on Shareholders and Investors upon Enforcement of the Fair Rules

Upon the enforcement of the Fair Rules, stock acquisition rights will be allotted, free of charge, to the shareholders recorded as of the record date for such allotment which is separately determined by the board of directors upon resolution of such allotment of stock acquisition rights. Under this procedure, as the relevant shareholders will become the right holders of such stock acquisition rights automatically as of the day any gratis allotment of stock acquisition rights becomes effective, it will be unnecessary for shareholders to make an application, etc. Please see to it, however, that if the relevant shareholders fail to pay money or follow other procedures, etc. related to the exercise of such stock acquisition rights as described in 6.(3)① below by the end of the exercise period therefor, there will be a dilution of per share value of the Company shares held by such shareholders along with the value of the entire shares of the Company held by such shareholders by the exercise of the stock acquisition rights by other shareholders.

On the other hand, as long as the procedures, etc. related to the exercise of such stock acquisition rights are followed and such stock acquisition rights are exercised, the value of the entire shares of the Company held by such shareholders will not be diluted, so no direct or specific influence on legal rights and economic interests of shareholders and investors other than those shareholders who are restricted to exercise such stock acquisition rights is expected.

In addition, the Company may, based on the board of directors' decision, acquire the relevant stock acquisition rights from the shareholders other than those who are restricted from exercising such stock acquisition rights such as the Purchaser, etc. and, in exchange therefor, deliver the Company shares, pursuant to the procedures stated in 6.(3)② below. When the Company follows these procedures for acquisition, the shareholders other than those who are restricted from exercising the relevant stock

acquisition rights will receive the common shares of the Company without exercising the stock acquisition rights or paying money corresponding to the exercise price thereof. Therefore, the per share value of the company shares held by such shareholders will be diluted, but there will be no dilution of the value of the entire shares of the Company held by such shareholders so no direct or specific influence on legal rights and economic interests of shareholders and investors other than those shareholders who are restricted to exercise such stock acquisition rights is expected.

As to the gratis allotment of stock acquisition rights, the Company may decide not to make such gratis allotment before the relevant gratis allotment becomes effective, or acquire the relevant stock acquisition rights, free of charge, after the relevant gratis allotment becomes effective, as described in 4.(1)⑦ above. Please see to it that, in such a case, as there will be no dilution of the stock value per share, those investors who purchased or sold the relevant shares based on the assumption that there will be a dilution of the stock value per share may suffer damage due to fluctuations in stock prices.

(3) Procedures, etc. Required with a Gratis Allotment of Stock Acquisition Rights

① Procedures for Exercising Stock Acquisition Rights

When the shareholders who were allotted stock acquisition rights desire to exercise such stock acquisition rights, it will be necessary for such shareholders to submit any documents required for the exercise of stock acquisition rights and to pay the exercise price thereof.

② Procedures to be Followed by the Company to Acquire Stock Acquisition Rights

When the board of directors decides to acquire stock acquisition rights, the Company may acquire the relevant stock acquisition rights as of the date separately designated by the board of directors by following the procedures prescribed by law. When such decision is made, the shareholders other than those who are restricted to exercise such stock acquisition rights such as the Purchaser, etc. will receive the common shares of the Company as consideration for the Company's acquisition of such stock acquisition rights without paying the money equivalent to the exercise price thereof.

In addition to the above, as to the details of the method of allotment, the method of exercising rights, and the method of acquiring the relevant rights by the Company, the Company will disclose or notify the relevant information to its shareholders after the relevant decision is made by the board of directors, so please refer to such information.

Exhibit 1

Status of the Major Shareholders (as of March 31, 2013)

Shareholder	Number of Shares Held (in 1,000s)	Investment Ratio (%)
Japan Trustee Services Bank, Ltd. (Trust Account)	19,298	6.7
The Master Trust Bank of Japan, Ltd. (Trust Account)	16,291	5.7
Nippon Life Insurance Company	13,435	4.7
The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd.	9,733	3.4
Mizuho Corporate Bank, Ltd.	9,070	3.2
Japan Trustee Services Bank, Ltd. (Trust Account 9)	8,949	3.1
Sompo Japan Insurance Inc.	7,742	2.7
The Dai-ichi Life Insurance Company, Limited	5,716	2.0
Mizuho Trust & Banking Co., Ltd. - Retirement Benefit Trusts, Mizuho Bank Ltd. Account, Re-trust Trustee, Asset Management Services Trust Account.	5,598	2.0
The Norinchukin Bank	5,350	1.9
Total	101,183	35.4

(Note) While the Company holds 9,937,434 treasury shares, it is not listed as the major shareholders above. The above Investment Ratios are calculated based on the number of shares, obtained by deducting the number of the treasury shares from the total number of issued and outstanding shares.

Exhibit 2

Brief Personal History of Members of the Independent Committee

Seigo Hanji

(Born on January 2, 1942)

April 1965 Joined DAIDO METAL Co., Ltd.
April 1980 Manager of Sales Department Tokyo branch office of DAIDO METAL Co., Ltd.
June 1993 Director and Deputy General Manager of the Third Business Department of DAIDO METAL Co., Ltd.
June 1995 President and Representative Director of DAIDO METAL Co., Ltd.
June 2005 President and Representative Director, and Chief Executive Officer of DAIDO METAL Co., Ltd.
June 2007 Chairperson and Representative Director, and Chief Executive Officer of DAIDO METAL Co., Ltd. (current)
June 2010 Director of Nichirei Corporation (current)

Status of Material Concurrent Office:

Chairperson and Representative Director, and Chief Executive Officer of DAIDO METAL Co., Ltd.

*There are no special interests between Mr. Hanji and the Company.

Kazuhiro Mishina

(Born on September 23, 1959)

September 1989 Assistant Professor of Harvard Business School
October 1995 Assistant Professor of Center for Investigation of Advanced Science and Technology, Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
April 1997 Assistant Professor of School of Knowledge Science, Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
October 2002 Assistant Professor of Graduate School of Business Administration, Kobe University
October 2004 Professor of Graduate School of Business Administration, Kobe University (current)
June 2012 Director of Nichirei Corporation (current)

Status of Material Concurrent Office:

Professor of Graduate School of Business Administration, Kobe University

*There are no special interests between Mr. Mishina and the Company.

Mami Taniguchi

(Born on June 8, 1966)

April 1999 Assistant Professor of International Business, Department of Economics, Hiroshima University of Economics
April 2000 Assistant Professor of Organization Theory, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Department of Management Studies, Hiroshima University
October 2000 Executive Roundtable Visiting Researcher, Organizational Behavior, School of Management, Boston University
April 2003 Associate Professor of International Business, School of Commerce, Waseda University
April 2007 Associate Professor of the Graduate School of Commerce, Waseda University
April 2008 Professor of International Business, Graduate School of Commerce, Waseda

University (current)
June 2012 Director of Nichirei Corporation (current)
Status of Material Concurrent Office:
Professor of International Business, Graduate School of Commerce, Waseda University
*There are no special interests between Ms. Taniguchi and the Company.

Kunitaro Saida

(Born on May 4, 1943)

April 1969 Appointed as a public prosecutor
November 2001 Chief Public Prosecutor of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office
February 2003 Superintendent Public Prosecutor of the Takamatsu High Public Prosecutors Office
June 2004 Superintendent Public Prosecutor of the Hiroshima High Public Prosecutors Office
August 2005 Superintendent Public Prosecutor of the Osaka High Public Prosecutors Office
May 2006 Retired from the above position
May 2006 Admitted to the bar (The Dai-ichi Tokyo Bar Association) (current)
June 2007 Statutory Auditor of Nichirei Corporation (current)
June 2008 Outside Director of Sumitomo Osaka Cement Co., Ltd. (current)
June 2010 Outside Director of Heiwa Real Estate Co., Ltd. (current)
Status of Material Concurrent Office:
Outside Director of Sumitomo Osaka Cement Co., Ltd., Outside Director of Heiwa Real Estate Co., Ltd.
*There are no special interests between Mr. Saida and the Company.

Masaaki Okajima

(Born on January 26, 1954)

April 1977 Joined the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
December 1995 Budget Officer of Food Agency
January 2003 Director of Budget Division, Minister's Secretariat, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
January 2004 Director-General of Forest Policy Planning Department, Forestry Agency
September 2005 Director - General for Policy Coordination, Minister's Secretariat, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
January 2006 Director of General of Food Policy Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
January 2008 Director-General of Minister's Secretariat, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
April 2010 Visiting Professor of Graduate School of Cultural and Creative Studies, Aoyama Gakuin University (current)
October 2011 Visiting Professor of Graduate School of Public Policy, Chuo University (current)
June 2012 Statutory Auditor of Nichirei Corporation (current)
*There are no special interests between Mr. Okajima and the Company.

Exhibit 3

Summary of Independent Committee Rules

- The independent committee shall be established by a resolution of the board of directors of the Company in accordance with the Fair Rules in order to assess and review, when a Proposing Party set forth in the Fair Rules appears, whether or not the takeover proposal will retain or improve the Company's corporate value and the common interests of its shareholders based on an independent determination from the board of directors, as well as assess and review whether the Proposing Party has complied with the Fair Rules.
- The members of the independent committee shall consist of three (3) or more members and be appointed by the board of directors from among persons who are classified as any of (i) outside directors of the Company, (ii) outside auditors of the Company or (iii) well-informed people, etc., who are reasonably considered to be independent of the management of the Company; provided, however, that well-informed people, etc. mentioned above shall mean any of proven corporate managers, persons skilled in investment banking, lawyers, certified public accountants or academic experts or any other persons who correspond thereto, who have entered into an agreement that includes a fiduciary duty provision, etc., as separately designated by the board of directors, between the Company.
- The term of office of the independent committee members shall expire upon the conclusion of the annual meeting of shareholders for the last fiscal year that is concluded within one (1) year after the selection of such members; provided, however, that such members may be reappointed by the board of directors. In addition, if an independent committee member who was an outside director or an outside auditor of the Company is no longer an outside director or an outside auditor of the Company, except for the case of reappointment, the term of the independent committee members shall be terminated accordingly; provided, however, that if such person satisfies the classification as the well-informed people, etc., he/she may be reappointed as a member of the independent committee by a resolution of the board of directors.
- The independent committee shall make a recommendation to the board of director for taking defensive measures (to make gratis allotment of stock acquisition rights) based on the Fair Rules with the reasons therefor in any of the following cases.
 - ① In the case where the independent committee decides that there is a violation of the procedures of the Fair Rules on the part of a Proposing Party, including the case where the Required Information has not been satisfactorily provided by the Proposing Party and despite a demand for the submission thereof, the Required Information has not been submitted by the Proposing Party by the designated date.
 - ② In the case where the independent committee decides that a proposed takeover impair the Company's corporate value and the common interests of its shareholders.
- The independent committee may make, as necessary, any recommendation including a recommendation for not taking defensive measures (not to make gratis allotment of stock acquisition rights) to the board of directors, except for the cases stated above.
- In addition to the above, the independent committee may conduct any of the following matters.
 - ① Examination and determination of whether or not the person is classified as a Proposing Party or a Purchaser that is subject to the Fair Rules.
 - ② Examination and determination of whether or not any reasonable reason for the extension of a review period exists.
 - ③ Determination of the details of the information to be submitted by a Proposing Party and by the board of directors of the Company to the independent committee and a date to reply thereof.
 - ④ Demand through the board of directors that a Proposing Party provide additional Required

Information if it is determined that sufficient information has not been provided by the Proposing Party.

- ⑤ Notification to the board of directors to the effect that the Required Information has been satisfactorily provided by a Proposing Party when the Required Information has been satisfactorily provided by a Proposing Party.
 - ⑥ Demand the board of directors of the Company to provide alternative proposals and review such alternative proposals
 - ⑦ Any other matters that are prescribed in the Fair Rules that the independent committee may conduct.
 - ⑧ Any matters that are separately prescribed by the board of directors that the independent committee may conduct.
- In order to collect necessary information, the independent committee may require the board of directors, statutory auditors, executive officers, employees or any other persons of the Company or its affiliates whose attendance is deemed to be necessary by the independent committee to attend the independent committee and may request an explanation regarding the matters required by the independent committee.
 - The independent committee may obtain advice from financial advisors, lawyers, certified public accountants and any other third party that is independent from the Company at the expense of the Company, within a reasonable amount as necessary.
 - Each independent committee member may convene the independent committee at any time in addition to the cases where a Proposing Party appears.
 - Any resolution of the independent committee shall be, with a majority of the independent committee members attending, adopted by a majority of the voting rights of the independent committee members present at the meeting.

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